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Abstract
Cooperation among humanitarian organizations has attracted increasing attention to en-
hance e↵ectiveness and e ciency of relief supply chains. Our research focuses on horizontal
cooperation in inventory management which is currently implemented in the United Nations Hu-
manitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) network. The present work follows a two-step research
approach, which involves collection of empirical data and quantitative modeling to examine
and overcome the coordination challenges of the network. Our interviews with members of the
network identified several managerial issues for sustainable cooperative inventory management
that the UNHRD network pursues. Using a newsvendor model in the context of non-cooperative
game theory, our research has explored member humanitarian organizations’ incentive of join-
ing the network, a coordination mechanism which achieves system optimality, and impacts of
members’ decisions about stock rationing. Our results indicate that behaviors of member HOs
do not necessarily align with the UNHRD’s expectation. Our results suggest that for system
optimality a system coordinator should carefully assess the circumstances, including demand
coe cient and stock rationing. Our research also proposes a policy priority for the first-best
system optimal inventory management.
KeyWords: humanitarian operations, inventory sharing and rationing, pre-positioned
stock management, newsvendor model, non-cooperative game theory
Received: April, 2015; Accepted: October 2016 by Shanthikumar J. after three revisions
1
1. Introduction
The increasing number and complexity of global disasters are calling for more e cient and
e↵ective logistics operations. Humanitarian and disaster operations rely heavily on logistics in
uncertain, risky, and urgent contexts, which di↵er from commercial logistics (Gatignon et al.,
2010; Kova´cs and Spens, 2007). In their attempt to mitigate these challenges to enhance the
resilience of disaster relief operations, humanitarian organizations (HOs) are forming structures
such as coordination bodies (Zhao et al., 2008). Most humanitarian logistics coordination mech-
anisms observed in reality take a horizontal cooperation style, which involves an umbrella agency
acting as a logistics infrastructure provider on a non-profit basis (Balcik et al., 2010). Hori-
zontal cooperation among HOs can be observed in fundraising, procurement, transportation,
and stock storage. Current research on humanitarian and disaster logistics also acknowledges
that horizontal cooperation among HOs could help enhance performances of relief supply chains
(Van Wassenhove, 2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Schulz, 2009; Feng and Shanthinkumar,
2016).
However, research on horizontal cooperation in the disaster relief context is still in its infancy
(Schulz and Blecken, 2010). This paper intends to address this research gap by focusing on hori-
zontal logistics cooperation among HOs in inventory management, including lateral stock trans-
shipment between HOs. This paper focuses on inventory management which is implemented
in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) network. The UNHRD man-
aged by World Food Program (WFP) is a network of depots in strategic locations around the
world which stores, manages and transports emergency relief items on behalf of HOs that are
members of this network mainly free of charge. Unlike private sectors’ horizontal cooperation
in their stock management, humanitarian sectors’ lateral stock transshipment is performed on a
borrowing and loaning scheme without generating additional monetary transfer between HOs,
that is, non-profitable stock transshipment. Little attention has been paid to explore lateral
stock transshipment on a non-profit basis although many studies about the counterpart on a
for-profit basis have been conducted. To gain insights regarding practical issues and empirical
data, we conducted interviews with the UNHRD and seven member HOs as well as several
non-member HOs before we develop analytical models.
Our interviews disclose perception gaps about the network operations between the UNHRD
and HOs. Responding to the tight budget constraint, the UNHRD is seeking to minimize system-
2
wide costs, which is referred to as system optimality in our paper. Currently, the UNHRD
expects further growth of stock transshipment between member HOs. Although interviewed
member HOs value services provided by the UNHRD network, the degrees of their involvement
into the UNHRD network di↵er depending on member HOs because of several impediments,
including long lead times and tendering processes as well as lack of traceability of the UNHRD.
Some member HOs are considering leaving the network or significantly reducing stocks stored in
warehouses of the UNHRD while exploiting benefits from the network. In our paper, a member
HO which stores its stocks in a warehouse of the UNHRD and thus can loan them is referred
to as a fully-participating member HO; and a member HO which does not store its stocks in a
warehouse of the UNHRD and thus cannot loan them is referred to as a partially-participating
member HO. To identify key factors that achieve system optimality of the UNHRD network,
our research proposes introducing a premium fee for member HOs’ usage of backups stocks.
Our second interviews with the UNHRD also confirm potential applicability of the premium in
the system. Based on results of our interviews, we develop quantitative models to answer the
following research questions:
• What are the members’ incentives to join the network?
• What are the e↵ects of introducing the premium fee on member HOs? Can the premium
be used as a coordination mechanism which achieves system optimality?
• What are the impacts of members’ decisions about the ratio of stocks allocated between
UNHRD’s warehouses and members’ own warehouses?
To answer these research questions, we have developed models under newsvendor settings
with backup stocks and stock transshipment among UNHRD members in the context of non-
cooperative game theory. Following insights of a series of interviews, our models cover three
options that member HOs face for managing their decentralized inventory systems: (1) being
fully in the UNHRD network; (2) staying partially in the network; and (3) staying completely
out of the network. As a benchmark setting, a model of a centrally coordinated system which
achieves system optimality is also developed in this paper. Then, numerical simulations have
been conducted to estimate the optimal expected inventory cost. Our analytical and numeri-
cal results indicate that a premium on usage of the UNHRD’s backup stocks would allow the
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network to achieve system optimality. However, our results also suggest that prior to imple-
menting the premium charge the UNHRD should resolve impediments which induce member
HOs’ partially-participating behavior if it pursues the first-best system optimality. Otherwise,
partially-participating member HOs would enjoy a lower expected inventory cost than loaning
member HOs after the premium charge is being implemented, which could increase the number
of partially-participating member HOs and eventually may compromise the functioning of the
stock transshipment. Developing an extended model with more than two member HOs, we have
also confirmed that the general trend of the results are robust with respect to the number of
HOs.
Following the introduction, section 2 describes a brief literature review related to our re-
search. In section 3, the structure and services of the UNHRD network as well as major findings
from our interviews are presented. Assuming that two HOs are in the network, section 4 de-
scribes our inventory models and analytical results. Following a setting with two HOs in the
network, section 5 explains the results of our numerical simulations as well as data used. To ver-
ify the robustness of results in the previous sections with respect to the number of member HOs,
section 6 explains results of numerical simulations based on an extended model with more than
two member HOs. Section 7 presents conclusions which focus on managerial recommendations
and future research avenues of this research.
2. Literature review
The research presented in this paper considers horizontal cooperation and inventory manage-
ment of HOs. This section reviews the previous literature in these two areas and highlights
novelties of our models. The terms cooperation and coordination have many definitions in the
literature in the area of logistics (Cruijssen et al., 2007; Schulz and Blecken, 2010; Ergun et al.,
2014). In previous literature (Minear, 2002; Stephenson Jr, 2005; Coles et al., 2012), the terms
coordination, collaboration, and partnerships are often used interchangeably. In our paper,
we use the term horizontal cooperation to specify the interactive and interdependent activities
between member HOs of the UNHRD network, including stock transshipment. However, inter-
dependent activities (e.g. stock transshipment) between member HOs may not always align with
the UNHRD’s goals, including system optimality, because these goals are not always member
HOs’ primary interests. In our paper, we use the word ”coordination” as UNHRD’s manage-
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ment activities to facilitate members’ horizontal cooperation and to match individual member
HO’s cooperation activities with system optimality. In this light, the meaning of “coordination”
in our paper is similar to the meaning of coordination mechanism defined by Xu and Beamon
(2006, p.4) as “ a set of methods to manage interdependence between organization.”
Much of the work in horizontal cooperation between HOs is descriptive and highlights types
of organizations which coordinate actions in practice (Minear, 2002; Stephenson Jr, 2005; Schulz,
2009; Schulz and Blecken, 2010). Although this area attracts strong interests from academics
and practitioners, the related quantitative analysis is rare, including partnership formation
(Coles and Zhuang, 2011), information sharing (Wakolbinger et al., 2013), cooperative fundrais-
ing activities (Toyasaki and Wakolbinger, 2014) and cost allocation of information technology
(Ergun et al., 2014). The present work analyzes horizontal cooperation in inventory manage-
ment, which is observed in the UNHRD network, applying non-cooperative game theory.
Several papers in operations management literature (Anupindi et al., 2001; Rudi et al.,
2001; Hu et al., 2007; O¨zen et al., 2008; Huang and Sosˇic´, 2010) focus on systems similar to the
UNHRD network where inventory sharing or lateral transshipments are possible. However, a
few studies investigate inventory management in the context of humanitarian operations (Bea-
mon and Kotleba, 2006a,b; Davis et al., 2013; Londree and Taskin, 2008; Manoj et al., 2016).
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no research quantitatively analyzes HOs’ horizontal
cooperation for inventory management, including lateral stock transshipment. Unlike existing
models from commercial settings, our models take into account the following three aspects: (1)
stock transshipment based on borrowing and loaning (2) inventory rationing decisions; and (3)
a logistics service provider on a non-profit basis. The previous models from the commercial set-
tings assume that stock transshipment is conducted based on players’ profit motivation through
transfer of a transshipment price. In our model stock transshipment is performed on a borrow-
ing and loaning scheme which does not aim to generate additional monetary transfer. Here,
penalty costs of leftover stocks are driving forces behind their stock transshipment. Our models
also assume that member HOs loan their stocks whenever they are requested. This assumption
can actually take into account HOs’ altruistic reasons for loaning stocks, which are confirmed
in our interviews. Some of the previous models (Anupindi et al., 2001; Granot and Sosˇic`, 2003;
Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007) assume allocation mechanism of profits and/or costs resulting
from cooperation. They explore co-opetition circumstances of private companies’ pooling in-
ventory management. Their models describe excess profits resulting from players’ cooperation
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applying cooperative game theory, in which players’ cooperation is considered as a premise by
assuming players’ binding commitment through, for example, a legal system. In contrast, our
models apply non-cooperative game theory to analyze players’ cooperation behavior focusing
on individual player’s self-enforcing motivations. Furthermore, the previous models assume
that all players fully participate in the system. Our models capture not only all players’ full
involvement, but also some players’ partial involvement in the system, reflecting member HOs’
inventory rationing decision observed in the UNHRD network.
Lastly, the relevant previous models (Anupindi et al., 2001; Rudi et al., 2001; Hu et al., 2007;
O¨zen et al., 2008; Huang and Sosˇic´, 2010), which explore lateral transshipment in decentralized
systems, assume single echelon systems (Paterson et al., 2011). Our models consider a two-
echelon system prepared by a logistics infrastructure provider, the UNHRD, on a non-profit
basis: lateral transshipment between member HOs and backup stocks (i.e. emergency shipments
from a di↵erent echelon) of the UNHRD. Stock management in two-echelon supply chains was
discussed in the context of competition between suppliers and retailers (Cachon and Zipkin,
1999; Lee and Whang, 1999; Cachon, 2001; Chen et al., 2001) for profits. In this setting, no
player behaves considering system optimality. In our setting, the upper stage (the UNHRD) acts
as the logistics service provider for the humanitarian community on a non-profit basis (Schulz
and Blecken, 2010). Our models intend to examine interactions between the UNHRD, which
seeks to pursue system optimality, and member HOs which consider their own costs. Here, no
competition caused by conflict of interests between the UNHRD and member HOs occurs. To
our best knowledge, few models consider impacts of a non-profitable logistics service provider on
lateral transshipment in decentralized systems. Like Rudi et al. (2001) and Hu et al. (2007), our
models assumes that only residual inventory is transshipped, which is called pooling of residual
(O¨zen et al., 2008). Unlike theirs, our models explore a premium for usage of backup stocks as
a mechanism for system optimality.
3. Background information about the UNHRD network
This section explains information relevant to our research about the UNHRD network. First, the
structure of the network and services that the UNHRD provides are explained. The explanation
focuses on information relevant to our models although the services that the UNHRD provides
cover many areas, including transportation, and provision of training facilities. Then, interview
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results which are directly related to assumptions of our models and numerical analysis are
highlighted.
3.1 Structure and services of the UNHRD network
Table 1: The UNHRD’s services relevant to stock management
Services Descriptions
Storage Member HOs can store as many items as they want
for free of charge. There is no minimum required
amount of storage.
Procurement Member HOs bear procurement costs plus
a management recovery cost of an additional 7%.
Stock transshipment The UNHRD promotes the option
(Stock swaps) of exchanging stocks between member HOs.
Member HOs have the right to sell, only borrow or loan stocks.
Real-time stock visibility is o↵ered to all member HOs.
Backup stocks “White Stocks” are suppliers’ stocks stored, within the network
(White Stocks and premises, but not marked with a member’s logo.
Virtual Stocks) “Virtual Stocks” refer to items which are positioned
within suppliers’ premises based on Long Term Agreements that
the WFP has with suppliers.
For backup stocks, payment does not become due
until a member HO buys them.
The UNHRD network intends to deliver humanitarian relief items worldwide to point of en-
try within 24-48 hours after a disaster occurs. Currently, the UNHRD provides logistics services
and comprehensive supply chain solutions for 78 partners including United Nations agencies,
government and non-governmental organizations. The network has six depots which are strate-
gically located in Accra (Ghana), Brindisi (Italy), Dubai (UAE), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia),
Panama City (Panama) and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain, operational from 2014). The
network facilities and services enable partners to coordinate their e↵orts, prioritize dispatches
to emergencies, loan and borrow stocks, and benefit from immediate access to relief items. Lo-
gistics solutions are shared among partners; therefore, they could minimize emergency response
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costs and ensure faster delivery of items (UNHRD, 2015).
Within the UNHRD network, the World Food Programme (WFP) acts as the service
provider for the humanitarian community on a non-profit basis (Schulz and Blecken, 2010).
Other humanitarian organizations can register as “authorized users” (hereafter members). Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the services directly relevant to this paper. The UNHRD provides its members
with “standard services” free of charge, including storage, o✏oading, receipt, warehousing, stock
management and administration, preparation for unbranded backup stocks (white stocks and
virtual stocks) and consolidated procurement and transportation services. Real-time stock vis-
ibility is o↵ered to all members and helps them to transship stocks in case of stockouts. If
HOs are not members of the UNHRD, then they are not allowed to enjoy services of stock
transshipment and backup stocks that the UNHRD provides. The UNHRD also provides its
member with “specific services” upon request and on the basis of full cost recovery, i.e. the cost
of the service plus a management recovery fee which is currently 7%. The specific services in-
clude major repairs, extraordinary maintenance of equipment, o✏oading of un-palletized cargo,
procurement of non-food items and services, transport of those items, technical missions to the
field, insurance, stock disposal and any other service required from the members (UNHRD,
2015). The UNHRD is responsible for delivering relief supplies at airports of the a↵ected areas
(point of entry) and not directly to the beneficiaries. Local government, local or international
HOs are responsible for the last-mile distribution.
The typical flow of transactions for a depot can be simplified and shown as in Figure 1.
During the disaster preparedness phase (dotted arrows of Figure 1), member HOs preposition
their own stocks via the UNHRD or directly from suppliers and the UNHRD prepares backup
stocks. During the disaster response phase (solid arrows of Figure 1), member HOs can exchange
stocks via transshipment in case of shortages during their disaster response operations. The
UNHRD also provides backup stocks that member HOs could use in case of running out of
stocks. However, as Figure 1 (b) describes, if HO i behaves as an partially-participating HO,
which does not have its stock in UNHRD’s warehouses to loan, then HO j cannot borrow or
buy stocks from HO i. In that case, HO j needs to rely on backup stocks only. A member HO
which borrows relief items from other member HOs is responsible to replenish them either by
its own procurement or procurement through the UNHRD as Table 1 describes.
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Figure 1: (a) Model FP and (b) Model PP
3.2 Main findings from interviews
We have conducted interviews with the UNHRD, six non-governmental organizations (CARE,
NCA, LWR, MercyCorps, ShelterBox and World Vision) and one governmental organization
(JICA). We also conducted informal discussions with organizations which are not members of
the network (for confidentially reasons we do not mention their names).
Our interview with the chief of the UNHRD reveals many managerial issues of the network
from the perspective of a system coordinator, including its budget situation and capacity of
backup stocks. The UNHRD plans to improve the “sustainability” of the network based on
four aspects: development of new services o↵ered from the UNHRD at the field level on the
basis of full recovery costs, promotion of relief item standardization, increase of the number
of members as well as the number of donors, and the capability of the network to respond to
two-three simultaneous disasters worldwide. The UNHRD is under pressure to run cost e cient
system. It has been facing 25% shortfall of operational funding. Thus, the cost e cient network
operation is a current crucial issue for the UNHRD. Regarding backup stocks that the UNHRD
prepares, the current capacity of backup stocks can cover unexpected demand of three disasters.
The UNHRD has never faced stockout of backup stocks except in two occasions. The chief of the
UNHRD explained in detail that these two occasions were caused by suppliers’ failures. After
the incidents, the UNHRD does not accept any agreement without seeing items physically. No
stockout has occurred after this remediation. We also recognize that no interviewed member
HO is concerned about backup stock shortages. UNHRD’s su cient backup stocks does not
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necessarily mean that relief items arrive to beneficiaries because UNHRD’s involvement finishes
at entry points. Indeed, the chief pointed out that distribution problems often occur after entry
points (i.e., last-mile distribution); however, last-mile distribution is currently out of scope of
the UNHRD work.
All of the interviewed member HOs elaborate on benefits and challenges of services that
the UNHRD network provides. They stated that free warehousing, stock transshipment, and
UNHRD’s backup stocks provide significant reduction of facilities and administrative cost of
running and maintaining own warehouses. For some of the interviewed member HOs, the
cost reduction from free warehousing and stock transshipment is the single reason to join the
network. The majority of interviewed member HOs utilize stock transshipment. They agree
that stock transshipment contributes to resolving stockouts and excess stocks. They also agree
that real-time stock visibility through IT systems that the UNHRD prepares facilitates stock
transshipment. Although interviewed member HOs value the services provided by the UNHRD
network, some member HOs reduce their participation in the network while exploiting only
benefits from the network due to its somewhat ine↵ective services. Some member HOs store the
majority of their stocks in UNHRD’s warehouses whereas some are reducing stocks stored at
the UNHRD system because of setting up their own new warehouses or several impediments to
e cient and e↵ective HOs’ response operations. They are planning only to borrow from other
member HOs in case that there is a need and not to loan stocks in the stock transshipment
system. As described in the introduction section, we call them partially-participating HOs.
They explained that they significantly reduce their stocks in UNHRD’s warehouse because of
lack of delivered product traceability, long tendering processes until transportation processes
start, and long lead times of restocking via the UNHRD (on average three months, sometimes six
or twelve months). They mentioned that they would increase their stocks if these impediments
were resolved.
4. Model
Following a series of interviews, we have developed stylized models under newsvendor set-
tings with backup stocks and stock transshipment among UNHRD members in the context
of non-cooperative game theory. Our models cover three options that member HOs face for
managing their decentralized inventory systems: (1) being fully in the UNHRD network (fully-
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participating model, Model FP ); (2) staying partially in the network (partially-participating
model, model PP ); and (3) staying completely out of the network (stand-alone model, Model
NV ). Model FP assumes that each member HO stores its stocks in warehouses of the UNHRD,
so that it can loan its stocks. In contrast, model PP assumes that some member HOs have
no stocks to loan in warehouses of the UNHRD. We call this type of member HOs partially-
participating HOs. Model NV assumes that HOs are not members of the UNHRD network,
which corresponds to the standard newsvendor model. As a benchmark, models of centrally
coordinated systems (Models CFP and CPP ) are also developed in this paper. A centrally
coordinated system assumes that a system coordinator, the UNHRD in our models, determines
each member HO’s order quantities to minimize system-wide costs. The resulting outcomes
indicate system optimality.
Reflecting facts about the UNHRD network from public information and our interviews,
our models make three major assumptions: newsvendor setting, unlimited backup stocks and
leftover penalty, and non-cooperative complete information game setting. The following is a
brief explanation for each assumption from the perspective of the findings from the interviews
presented in section 3.2.
Newsvendor setting
The demand for relief items during the response phase of a disaster is highly unpredictable and
member HOs cannot expect to replenish their products from suppliers within an acceptable
response time as our interviews found. Thus, when a disaster occurs demand has to be satisfied
through pre-positioned stocks. The findings from our interviews also support the assumption
that cost e ciency is a major reason for all of the interviewed HOs (the single reason for some
of them) to join the network. Due to this fact, our models assume that member HOs seek to
minimize their expected inventory costs.
Unlimited backup stocks and leftover penalty cost
As discussed in section 3.1, the UNHRD is not currently concerned about the shortage
of its backup stocks. In light of this fact, our models assume that member HOs can access
backup stocks whenever they need (i.e., unlimited backup stocks). Furthermore, member HOs
are required to discard their expired stocks or to “take back any stocks for which no movement
has been recorded after 24 months” at stock owner’s expense (UNHRD, 2011). Following this
fact, our models assume leftover penalty costs.
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Non-cooperative complete information game
Each member HO determines its procurement level independently. As described in section 3.2,
the UNHRD provides member HOs with real time reports about their stocks in warehouses
of the UNHRD. The information includes which members are storing which items and where
within the network. Member HOs with stock deficits know for sure that they can borrow stocks
from member HOs with excess stocks. Following the fact, our models apply non-cooperative
complete information game theory to the decentralized inventory model.
We consider a stylized model which consists of two humanitarian organizations indexed by
i and j. The notation is summarized in Table 2. The demand that HO i faces is assumed
to be a positive random variable Xi with a strictly increasing distribution function FXi(x).
Before demand is realized, HO i orders Qi units from external suppliers at the cost of ci per
unit. The transshipments in our model are operated in terms of borrowing or loaning items.
If demand during the period turns out to be larger than Qi, HO i tries to satisfy the shortage
by transshipment from HO j, i 6= j. If HO i borrows items, it replenishes them at their usual
cost ci and returns them to HO j after the period is over. The lending HO avoids the leftover
penalty cost which is only applicable to items without turnover. A unit stock transshipment
cost incurred by borrower i is defined as ci + ⌧ji. Because of the transaction cost ⌧ji (e.g., cost
related to relabeling, repacking, and searching), it is not optimal for either of the two HOs to
rely solely on stock transshipment.
If shortages cannot be fully satisfied by transshipment, backup stocks can be used. Backup
stock cost cw consists of three components (the UNHRD, www.unhrd.org): (1) the price that
the UNHRD pays to a supplier of backup stock, (2) the management recovery cost of 7% of
the procurement, and (3) the administration and handling costs incurred by member HOs that
use backup stocks. The management recovery cost as well as administration and handling
costs are standard fees that the UNHRD charges. Hence, cw is typically larger than the unit
procurement cost ci that the HOs pay for their own stocks and it is larger than the cost of a
unit transshipment ci+ ⌧ji. Therefore, we assume that using backup stocks is more costly than
using transshipments, i.e. cw   ci+ ⌧ji. In addition, we assume that si+ ⌧ji   sj which ensures
that excess stock from HO j is only transshipped to HO i if i is facing a shortage. These are
the standard complete pooling assumptions which are required for the model to make ”sense”
(Pasternack and Drezner, 1991).
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Table 2: Notation
Notation Description
Qi procurement (ordering) quantity by HO i
Qki equilibrium or optimal procurement (ordering) quantity
by HO i under model k 2 {FP, PP,NV,CFP,CPP}
Cki expected inventory costs of HO i under model k 2 {FP, PP,NV,CFP,CPP}
Xi demand faced by HO i (random variable)
FXi(xi) cumulative distribution function of Xi
fXi(xi) probability density function of Xi
ci unit procurement cost that HO i bears
si penalty cost per unit of leftover stock that HO i bears
⌧ij transaction cost per unit of stock transferred from HO i to HO j
cw unit backup stock cost charged by the UNHRD
⌧wi premium on backup stock that HO i pays to UNHRD
pi unit stockout penalty cost that HO i bears
4.1 Full participation in the network (FP)
Model FP describes a case where member HO i and HO j keep all their prepositioned stocks
in warehouses of the UNHRD; thus, they can loan their stocks to each other. In this case, each
member HO determines its order quantity which minimizes its own inventory costs.
The expected inventory cost incurred by HO i is given by
CFPi (Qi, Qj) =E[ciQi + si(Qi  Xei )+
+ (ci + ⌧ji)((Xi  Qi)+   (Xni  Qi)+)
+ (cw + ⌧wi)(X
n
i  Qi)+]. (1)
HO i’s expected inventory cost function consists of its procurement cost, leftover penalty, cost
incurred by stock transshipment from HO j to i, and cost incurred in backup stock from the
UNHRD. Following Huang et al. (2011), we define Xei
.
= Xi + (Xj   Qj)+ as the e↵ective
demand for HO i. It includes the demand which directly comes to HO i plus the part of HO j’s
demand that can not be satisfied by HO j. Similarly, Xni
.
= Xi  (Qj  Xj)+ is the net demand
for HO i, which is the demand that comes directly to HO i minus the part that can be satisfied
by HO j.
Notice that the unit cost incurred in the backup stock consists of two parts: backup stock
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cost, cw, and premium incurred by HO i, ⌧wi. Backup stock cost cw is a standard fee that
the UNHRD currently charges to member HOs which use backup stocks of the UNHRD. Our
model introduces ⌧wi as a premium for backup stocks of the UNHRD when HO i uses them.
Currently, the UNHRD does not charge the premium. As the later sections of this paper
discuss, our research has verified analytically as well as numerically that system optimality can
be achieved by charging the premium on member HOs. There are two reasons why the premium
for backup stock is considered in our models. One reason is that introducing the premium in our
models allows us to identify key factors that achieve system optimality of the UNHRD network.
Secondly, following our interviews with the UNHRD, we recognize that measures for system
optimality need to satisfy three conditions: 1) direct controllability by the UNHRD; 2) no
financial burden to the UNHRD; and 3) potential revenue source for the UNHRD. Introducing
the premium for the backup stock satisfies these three conditions. To our best knowledge, other
measures theoretically considered cannot meet these conditions.
Notice that the expected cost function of HO i, CFPi (Qi, Qj), depends not only on its own
stocking level Qi but also on Qj . The partial derivative of (1) with respect to Qi obtains the
first-order condition,
(ci + ⌧ji)FXi(Qi) + siFXei (Qi) + (cw + ⌧wi   ⌧ji   ci)FXni (Qi)  (cw + ⌧wi   ci) = 0. (2)
HO j’s first-order condition can be obtained in a similar way.
From the assumption cw   ci + ⌧ji, the expected cost function is convex in Qi, which guar-
antees the existence of Nash equilibrium (Cachon and Netessine, 2006). The Nash equilibrium,
(QFPi , Q
FP
j ), can be obtained by solving the first-order conditions for i and j simultaneously.
Proposition 4.1. Under full participation (FP) in the network, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, (QFPi , Q
FP
j ).
Proof. The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1 in Rudi et al. (2001). The
implicit di↵erentiation of (2) derives
@Qi
@Qj
=   sigXei (Qi) + (cw + ⌧wi   ci   ⌧ji)gXni (Qi)
(ci + ⌧ji)fXi(Qi) + sifXei (Qi) + (cw + ⌧wi   ci   ⌧ji)fXni (Qi)
. (3)
For Xei , define fXei (Qi)
.
= @FXei (Qi)/@Qi and gXei (Qi)
.
= @FXei (Qi)/@Qj , and similarly
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for Xni . From the definitions of the e↵ective demand and the net demand, one can derive
FXei (Qi)  FXi(Qi)  FXni (Qi), which leads to fXei (Qi)   gXei (Qi) and fXni (Qi)   gXni (Qi),
respectively. Combining these properties and our assumption cw   ci + ⌧ji, one can conclude
that  1  @Qi@Qj  0. That is, the slopes of the best response functions are less than one, which
is the su cient condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Cachon and Netessine,
2006).
Corollary 4.2. The optimal procurement quantity QFPi and Q
FP
j is increasing in the premium
⌧wi and ⌧wj, respectively.
Corollary 4.2 implies that raising the unit backup stock cost would lead member HOs to
increase their inventory levels.
The interview with the chief of the UNHRD indicates necessity for cost e cient operations
of the network due to its 25% shortfall of operational funding (see section 3.2). Informal discus-
sions with some non-member HOs also imply the importance of accountability to donors about
e cient operations of the network. To analyze how the UNHRD network can achieve system
optimality, we develop a centrally coordinated model denoted as CFP . The centrally con-
trolled system achieves system optimality. In this setting, a system coordinator, the UNHRD,
determines HO i and HO j’s order quantities to minimize the total costs incurred by the system.
The expected total cost of the centralized system under full participation is
CCFP (Qi, Qj) =E[
X
i,j,i 6=j
(ciQi + si(Qi  Xei )+
+ ⌧ji((Xi  Qi)+   (Xni  Qi)+)
+ cw(X
n
i  Qi)+)] (4)
Notice that in the centrally coordinated system the items are not borrowed or sold but they
are shared without asking for a replacement when stock transshipment occurs. The transac-
tion cost is still incurred because it reflects handling and administration costs that the system
coordinator bears.
Since we assume cw   ci + ⌧ji and si + ⌧ji   sj , CCFP (Qi, Qj) is convex in (Qi, Qj) (see
online appendix for the proof of convexity in the centralized systems). The optimal procurement
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quantities QCFPi satisfy the following first-order condition:
(⌧ij + ⌧ji   cw   sj)FXi(Qi) + (si   ⌧ij + cw)FXei (Qi) + (cw   ⌧ji + sj)FXni (Qi)  (cw   ci) = 0.
(5)
From this the following result can be derived.
Proposition 4.3. The premium ⌧⇤wi which leads to the optimal centralized policy is given by
⌧⇤wi =
(cw   ⌧ij)(FXi(QCFPi )  FXei (QCFPi ))  (ci + sj)(FXni (QCFPi )  FXi(QCFPi ))
(1  FXni (QCFPi ))
, (6)
where QCFPi is the optimal order quantity under centralized control.
Proof. The coordinating premium induces the HOs to choose the same order quantities under
decentralized and centralized settings. Therefore ⌧⇤wi in (6) is found by equating the left-hand
sides of equations (2) and (5) at Qi = QCFPi .
Proposition 4.3 allows us to provide two implications about network coordination mecha-
nisms. First, charging the premium allows the network to achieve system optimality. Second,
⌧⇤wi can be di↵erent for the two HOs depending on their cost and demand parameters. This
implies that UNHRD might need to charge di↵erent fees for di↵erent member HOs, which may
ignite an additional conflict between member HOs.
4.2 Partial participation in the network (PP)
Following our interview results, this section describes the partial participation scenario PPi, in
which one of the two organizations, member HO i, does not store its stocks in warehouses of the
UNHRD and keeps all its inventory in its own warehouses whereas member HO j stores all its
stocks in warehouses of the UNHRD (see Figure 1(b)). Member HO i does not loan its stocks
to HO j because HO i’s stocks are not recognized by HO j and the UNHRD, but member HO
i still can borrow stocks through stock transshipment from HO j and/or use the backup stock
from the UNHRD. This means that member HO j can only rely on backup stocks from the
UNHRD when it faces a stockout.
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The expected inventory cost of HO i, which stores all its stocks in its own warehouse, is:
CPPii (Qi, Qj) =E[ciQi + si(Qi  Xi)+
+ (ci + ⌧ji)((Xi  Qi)+   (Xni  Qi)+)
+ (cw + ⌧wi)(X
n
i  Qi)+]. (7)
Notice that si is a penalty cost per unit of leftover stocks in HO i’s own warehouse.
The expected inventory cost of member HO j, which can not borrow items through trans-
shipment, is:
CPPij (Qi, Qj) = E[cjQj + sj(Qj  Xej )+ + (cw + ⌧wj)(Xj  Qj)+]. (8)
Notice that, unlike CPPii , C
PPi
j does not include the cost of stock transshipment from i because
i does not have its stocks in the UNHRD network and j cannot rely on it.
The first-order conditions of (7) and (8) are
(ci + si + ⌧ji)FXi(Qi) + (cw + ⌧wi   ci   ⌧ji)FXni (Qi)  (cw + ⌧wi   ci) = 0 (9)
(cw + ⌧wj)FXj (Qj) + sjFXej (Qj)  (cw + ⌧wj   cj) = 0, (10)
respectively.
CPPii (Qi, Qj) is convex inQi and C
PPi
j (Qi, Qj) is convex inQj , which guarantee the existence
of the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium, (QPPii , Q
PPi
j ), can be obtained by solving
equations (9) and (10) simultaneously.
Proposition 4.4. Under partial participation (PP) in the network, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, (QPPii , Q
PPi
j ).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1 we can derive that  1  @Qi@Qj  0 and  1 
@Qj
@Qi
 0, which is the su cient condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
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Corollary 4.5. The optimal procurement quantity QPPi and Q
PP
j is increasing in the backup
charge ⌧wi and ⌧wj, respectively.
Next we introduce a centralized model under HO i’s partial participation in the network,
denoted as model CPPi. The expected total cost of this system is:
CCPPi(Qi, Qj) =E[ciQi + cjQj + si(Qi  Xi)+ + sj(Qj  Xej )+
+ ⌧ji((Xi  Qi)+   (Xni  Qi)+)
+ cw((X
n
i  Qi)+ + (Xj  Qj)+)] (11)
since cw   ci + ⌧ji and si + ⌧ji   sj , CCPPi(Qi, Qj) is convex in (Qi, Qj). The optimal
procurement quantities QCPPii and Q
CPPi
j satisfy the first-order conditions:
(si   sj + ⌧ji)FXi(Qi) + (cw + sj   ⌧ji)FXni (Qi)  (cw   ci) = 0, (12)
⌧jiFXj (Qj) + (cw + sj   ⌧ji)FXej (Qj)  (cw   cj) = 0. (13)
Proposition 4.6. Under partial participation, the decentralized system cannot be coordinated
using the premiums ⌧wi and ⌧wj as a coordination mechanism.
Proof. In order to coordinate the system under partial participation, the pair of backup charges
(⌧⇤⇤wi , ⌧⇤⇤wj) should be set as
⌧⇤⇤wi =
(sj + ci)(FXi(Q
CPPi
i )  FXni (QCPPii ))
1  FXni (QCPPii )
, (14)
⌧⇤⇤wj =
(cw   ⌧ji)(FXj (QCPPij )  FXej (QCPPij ))
1  FXj (QCPPij )
. (15)
Notice that ⌧⇤⇤wi is always negative. Namely, there is no premium such that ⌧wi   0.
Proposition 4.6 implies that a premium for backup stocks cannot work as a feasible mech-
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anism for system optimality under the circumstance of partial participation. This is similar to
the result of Hu et al. (2007). In the commercial setting, Hu et al. (2007) also prove that if two
retailers have certain asymmetries in their problem parameters a coordinating transshipment
price might not exist. Proposition 4.6 implies that allowing transshipment in only one direction
induces a strong asymmetric e↵ect on the premiums, even if the two HOs are symmetric in their
demand and cost parameters. Hence, in our model PP the UNHRD should employ some other
contract mechanism. We leave this issue for future research.
Comparing the first order conditions under full and partial participation, one can derive the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.7. The following hold for the Nash equilibria under full and partial participation:
(i) QFPi   QPPii and QFPj  QPPij ;
(ii) QCFPi   QCPPii and QCFPj  QCPPij .
Corollary 4.7 indicates that the borrower HO i’s equilibrium order quantity would be smaller
under partial participation compared to the full participation and the opposite applies to the
loaner HO j. This holds true for both the decentralized and centralized systems. Further, for
the symmetric setting, we can derive the following.
Corollary 4.8. If the cost and demand parameters are equal for both HOs, then QPPii  QPPij .
Corollary 4.8 indicates that, under partial participation with symmetric parameters, HO i
(partially-participating HO) orders less than HO j (fully-participating HO) in the equilibrium.
4.3 No participation in the network (NV)
To analyze incentives that make HOs join the UNHRD network, this section describes a stand-
alone setting, in which HOs are not members of the network. They run their own warehouses
and cannot access the stock transshipment and/or backup stocks. If HO i faces a larger demand
than its procurement, it incurs a penalty cost of pi > ci per unsatisfied demand. The penalty
cost covers the additional costs incurred for quick replenishment, for example, via air shipment
from its central warehouses, and the loss of reputation which may cause the reduction of future
funding.
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This setting corresponds to the standard newsvendor model and the expected cost can be
written as
CNVi (Qi) = E[ciQi + si(Qi  Xi)+ + pi(Xi  Qi)+], (16)
which is a convex function of Qi (Khouja, 1999) and the order quantity which minimizes (16)
is QNVi = F
 1
Xi
⇣
pi ci
pi+si
⌘
.
From HOs’ perspective, there would be no cost advantage by joining the network if the
stockout penalty cost (i.e., pi) is less than the cost of using stock transshipment and/or backup
stock options. Therefore, model NV assumes that the unit penalty cost is higher than the cost
incurred by the stock transshipment and/or the backup stock that the UNHRD network o↵ers.
That is, pi   cw   ci + ⌧ji.
Regarding the total system costs under di↵erent scenarios, one can derive the following.
Corollary 4.9. For pi   cw, CCFP  CCPPi  CNVi + CNVj .
Corollary 4.9 indicates that the centralized system under member HOs’ full participation
can achieve the lowest system optimal cost. Following the result of Corollary 4.9, one can
also conclude: for ⌧⇤wi, ⌧⇤wj , ⌧⇤⇤wi and ⌧⇤⇤wj , CFPi + CFPj  CPPii + CPPij  CNVi + CNVj . These
results suggest that the UNHRD should change its policy priority for its sustainable network
operations. Specifically, the UNHRD should prepare a circumstance where member HOs fully
participate in the network before implementing the premium fee for system optimality if it seeks
the first-best outcome.
The analytical results in this section do not answer the ordering of the expected inventory
costs for arbitrary backup stock premiums. Hence, we leave this analysis to our numerical
simulations in section 5.
5. Numerical analysis
In this section, we shed light on how di↵erent demand patterns impact order quantities and
expected costs using numerical simulations. The convexity of the cost functions with respect
to Qi and Qj and the uniqueness of the Nash-equilibrium proven in section 4 allow us to use
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a line search to find the intersection of the response function and, hence, the Nash equilibrium
procurement quantities.
5.1 Data
Our numerical simulations have been conducted under the assumption that the HOs are sym-
metric in their cost parameters. From our interviews and UNHRD’s real time stock levels
(http://www.unhrd.org), we assume that transferable items among HOs are products such as
blankets, of which unit procurement costs are relatively similar among HOs, but they are not
always perfectly substitutable. The assumption of symmetric costs also allows us to focus on
impacts of discrepancies of demand patterns between member HOs on network coordination
mechanisms.
Specifically, we explore the impacts of coe cient of variation of demand, cv, and correlation
of demands, ⇢. A negative correlation can happen if the HOs are competing for supplying
items to the same group of beneficiaries. On the other hand, the size of total demand depends
on external factors, mainly on the size of the disaster, which implies a positive correlation of
demands across HOs.
In order to identify the range of demand cv, we evaluated the disaster and emergency relief
data of JICA (http://www.jica.go.jp) from 2006 to 2014. For many items cv is around 1,
and if demand is disaggregated to specific geographical regions, it increases up to 1.5-2. We
also observed that the demand distribution is skewed rather than symmetric. Based on this
observations, we assume a gamma distribution for demands, which allows us to consider higher
levels of coe cients of variation than other distributions, such as the normal distribution.
The parameters presented in Table 3 have been used for our simulations. As Table 3 shows,
numerous combinations of demand parameters (i.e., µi, cvi and ⇢) between the two HOs have
been used for the simulations. Indexes of HOs in the cost parameters are dropped due to the
symmetric cost parameter assumption between the two HOs.
For the procurement cost, c, we refer to the unit price of a blanket shown in the UNICEF
Supply Catalogue (https://supply.unicef.org). Backup stock cost, cw, consists of three compo-
nents (www.unhrd.org): (1) price that the UNHRD pays to a supplier of backup stock, cb ,
(2) the management recovery cost of 7% of the procurement (a standard fee that the UNHRD
charges), and (3) transaction costs ⌧ incurred by member HOs that use backup stocks. Hence,
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Table 3: Demand and cost parameters
Demand parameters
Mean demand of HO i and j µi, µj {50, 100}
Coe cient of variation of demand of HO i and j cvi, cvj {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}
Correlation coe cient of demand of the two HOs ⇢ {-0.7, -0.3, 0, 0.3, 0.7}
Cost parameters
Unit procurement cost that a HO bears c 5
Unit procurement cost that the UNHRD bears for backup stock cb {5,7,9.3}
Leftover penalty s {0.1,0.5,2.5}
Transaction cost ⌧ {0.3,0.5,0.8,1.0,1.3,1.5,1.8,2.0,2.3,2.5}
Premium for usage of the UNHRD’s backup stock ⌧w {0.0,0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0,2.5}
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Figure 2: Optimal order quantities in the centralized QCFPi and decentralized systems Q
FP
i with respect
to the premium ⌧w
we define the backup stock cost as cw
.
= 1.07· cb + ⌧ . Reflecting comments in our interviews,
base case values of the parameters are set as µi = µj = 100, c = cb = 5, s = 0.1, cvi = cvj = 0.5
and ⌧ = 0.5.
5.2 Coordination mechanism
Currently, the UNHRD does not charge a premium for its backup stock service (i.e., ⌧w = 0).
Due to the current low backup stock cost, there is a concern that member HOs may depend
too much on backup stocks (Schulz, 2009). From the results of Proposition 4.6, we learn that
no applicable premium exists under member HO i’s partial participation. In this subsection,
we focus on identifying key factors for implementation of the premium provided that member
HO i and j both fully participate in the network.
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Observation 5.1. The levels of the premium, ⌧⇤w, for backup stocks where system optimality is
achieved are sensitive to demand correlation, ⇢. For a positive (negative) ⇢, ⌧⇤w tends to become
lower (higher) (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal order quantity for HO i under case FP and CFP . As
shown in Corollary 4.2, the decentralized optimal procurement quantity QFPi is increasing in
⌧w. Let ⌧⇤w denote the levels of ⌧w where the minimum total network cost is achieved (i.e., system
optimality), that is, the intersection of the curves of QFPi and Q
CFP
i in the figures. Figure 2
indicates that under the current setting of the UNHRD (i.e. ⌧w = 0) system optimality can not
be attained.
As Figure 2 shows, ⇢ has a major impact on ⌧⇤w. Figure 2 (c) indicates that for ⇢ = 0.7
system optimality can be achieved at ⌧⇤w = 0.19, which is around 4.75% of c. When the
demand correlation between the two HOs is positive (i.e., ⇢ = 0.7), the risk pooling e↵ect from
stock transshipment becomes smaller, in which case advantages of the network come from the
availability of the UNHRD’s backup stock. Thus, from the perspective of system optimality, a
relatively low ⌧⇤! should be set up in such a way that member HOs can use the backup stock
option to a large extent. Whereas, as Figure 2 (a) shows, system optimality has been achieved
at a level of ⌧w around 2.2 when ⇢ =  0.7. If the demand correlation between the two HOs is
negative (i.e., ⇢ =  0.7), the risk pooling e↵ect from the transshipments is large. A relatively
high ⌧⇤w should be set up so that the HOs increase order quantities and use stock transshipments
rather than the backup stock option. We have also confirmed that this general trend of ⌧⇤w in ⇢
holds for the di↵erent levels of s and cw.
As Figure 2 indicates, the trend of ⌧⇤w in ⇢ stems from sensitivity di↵erences to ⇢ between
QFPi and Q
CFP
i . In other words, Q
CFP
i shifts more substantially than Q
FP
i for the di↵erent
levels of ⇢. Under the current low cw, the HOs can secure themselves with the backup stock
option in a costless manner, rather than relying on the stock transshipment option. They tend
to ignore benefits of risk pooling via stock transshipment and behave (almost) independently of
each other. When the HOs tend to behave independently, demand correlation, ⇢, cannot a↵ect
their procurement decisions. In contrast, the centralized case (i.e., model C) can adapt the
system to the change of ⇢ more e↵ectively than model FP , which enables member HOs to fully
enjoy benefits of risk pooling. This is why QCFPi is more sensitive than Q
FP
i to the changes of
⇢. The impact of correlation on centralized optimal order quantities has been proven by Dong
and Rudi (2004) for normally distributed demands. The simulation results indicate that this
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Figure 3: Optimal order quantities in the centralized QCi and decentralized systems Q
FP
i with
respect to the premium ⌧w, when ⇢ = 0.7
trend holds for demands following a gamma distribution as Figure 2 shows. That is, QCFPi
decreases as ⇢ increases. We have also confirmed that the optimal order quantities decrease
more significantly when cw is low and/or s is high. This result is also consistent with Dong and
Rudi (2004).
Observation 5.2. The levels of the premium, ⌧⇤w, for backup stocks where system optimality
is achieved is relatively insensitive to demand coe cient of variation, cv, compared to demand
correlation, ⇢ (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows, the levels of ⌧⇤w are relatively consistent regardless of the cv levels. This result
is caused by the fact that QFPi and Q
CFP
i shift downward in similar magnitude as cv increases,
which implies that the decentralized system (i.e., model FP ) reacts to demand variability as
e↵ectively as the centralized system (i.e., model C). Our simulation has confirmed that this
trend also holds for di↵erent levels of ⌧ , s and ⇢.
5.3 Impacts of members’ rationing decision
Our interviews reveal that cost e ciency does not always motivate member HOs to fully par-
ticipate in the UNHRD network. Some member HOs are substantially reducing the ratio of
their stocks in warehouses of the UNHRD due to several impediments that the network has, for
examples, long lead times for restocking and lack of traceability.
As Proposition 4.6 indicates, under a member HO’s partial involvement in the network, there
24
is no applicable premium that achieves system optimality. However, considering the current
situation where member HOs have di↵erent levels of involvement to the network, a question
would arise: what if the premium is implemented under the circumstance of member HOs’
partial involvement? The numerical experiments in this section would answer this question.
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Figure 4: Expected cost CFPi , C
PPi
i , C
PPi
j with respect to the premium ⌧w
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Figure 5: Expected optimal cost CFPi , C
PPi
i , C
PPi
j with respect to the premium ⌧w: high
procurement cost for backup stock, that is, cw = 10.5.
The impacts of member HOs’ rationing decision (i.e., either storing at UNHRD’s or storing at
members’ own warehouses and just using the network for borrowing) on member HOs’ expected
total inventory costs are shown in Figure 4. It presents the expected optimal cost of HO i and
j with respect to the backup stock premium ⌧w under model FP and PP . Figures 4 indicates
that fully participating HO j enjoys lower expected inventory cost under FP than PPi; that is,
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CPPij   CFPj for any ⌧w and ⇢. However, this trend is not true for partially participating HO i.
HO i’s cost under model PPi, C
PPi
i , can be higher (Figure 4 (a)) or lower (Figure 5) than its
cost under model FP , CFPi .
Observation 5.3. Member HO i, which does not store stocks in warehouses of the UNHRD but
just uses the network for borrowing, tends to enjoy lower expected inventory costs than member
HO j, which stores all its stocks at warehouses of the UNHRD (i.e., CPPii < C
PPi
j ). The cost
discrepancy between the two member HOs tend to: (1) be smaller as demand correlation, ⇢,
increases; and (2) be enlarged as the premium for backup stocks, ⌧w, increases (see Figures 4
and 5).
Interestingly, HO i could enjoy a larger cost-saving benefit than HO j under the model PPi
if the UNHRD implements a premium fee (i.e., ⌧w > 0). We call this advantage of HO i free-
rider benefits. Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 5, one can recognize that a higher backup stock
cost in Figure 5 would increase HO i’s free-rider benefit. The free-rider benefit decreases as ⇢
increases. This is because the risk pooling e↵ect associated with the UNHRD network decreases
when both of the HOs’ demands have a similar trend (i.e., ⇢ > 0). If additional fixed costs (e.g.,
administrative costs for running HO i’s own warehouse) are included into our model, then the
free-rider benefit might become a minor issue. Nonetheless, the results indicate that the network
has an intrinsic risk that would encourage member HOs’ partially-participating behavior. This
intrinsic weakness of the system is considered to somewhat explain why currently some HOs
are reducing the ratio of stocks in the UNHRD and are relying on borrowing stocks from other
member HOs.
Our simulation also has revealed that a high left-over penalty (e.g., s is more than 50%
of c) would prevent HO i from being a free-rider, e↵ect of which, however, is canceled out if
a system coordinator sets up a high backup stock cost, (cw is more than 100% of c). This is
because a higher backup stock cost drives the HOs to increase their procurement rather than
rely on the UNHRD’s backup stocks. In the meanwhile, only HO i can enjoy benefits of stock
transshipment from HO j.
Lastly, we compare CFP with the expected cost of a stand-alone HO under model NV (i.e.,
CNV ).
Observation 5.4. A member HO’s expected inventory cost under the full participation setting,
CFPi , is lower than the cost under the stand-alone setting, C
NV
i .
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We have confirmed from our simulations that the result of Observation 5.4 holds even if
penalty costs of stockout are rather low (e.g. p = 10). This result is also consistent with
comments of interviewee HOs, in which they explained that the cost e ciency is a major reason
for joining the network.
6. Extension to multiple HOs
In previous sections, analysis has been conducted based on a setting with two HOs. The
question still has remained unanswered whether the general trend of the results is robust with
respect to the number of member HOs. To answer this question, this section presents a brief
extension to a setting with more than two HOs in the system, where some member HOs are
fully participating in the system and the rest of them are partially participating. Let N denote
the total number of member HOs in the system. Let i, j = 1, ..., n, ..., N where i 6= j as indexes
of member HOs, assuming that the first n HOs store their stocks in warehouses of the UNHRD
(i.e., i = 1, ..., n) and the last N  n HOs do not store their stocks there. That is, stocks can be
transshipped only from HOs i = 1, ..., n to HOs i = 1, ..., N . When all N HOs store their stocks
in warehouses of the UNHRD (i.e. n = N), we denote it as FPN since this case corresponds to
the full participation model. If at least one member HO does not store its stocks in warehouses
of the UNHRD, (i.e. n 6= N), then we denote this case as PPN,n since this falls into the partial
participation model.
Analyzing such a system with more than two decentralized agents is known to be a nontrivial
task (Rudi et al., 2001; Huang and Sosˇic´, 2010; Shao et al., 2011). First, an allocation rule for
stock transshipment between member HOs has to be defined for assigning the leftovers to HOs
with shortages. Referring to Huang and Sosˇic´ (2010), the following proportional allocation
rule is applied to our models. Under this allocation rule, the amount that HO i receives via
transshipments is TIi = min(TL, TS)(Xi Qi)+/TS, where TS =
PN
i=1(Xi Qi)+ is the total
stock deficits which may be covered by transshipment and TL =
Pn
i=1(Qi  Xi)+ is the total
excess stocks which can be used for transshipment. The first term, min(TL, TS), is the total
amount of stocks which can be transshipped. This term is multiplied by the proportion of
HO i’s stock deficits to the total deficits. Similarly, the quantity that HO i transships out is
TOi = min(TL, TS)(Qi  Xi)+/TL for i = 1, ..., n and TOi = 0 for i = n+ 1, ..., N .
After realizing the amount of stock transshipment, HO i might either have leftovers Li =
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(Qi  Xi   TOi)+ or need to purchase backup stocks as many as Si = (Xi  Qi   TIi)+. The
total expected cost incurred by HO i for model k 2 {FPN , PPN,n} is
Cki = E[ciQi + siLi + (ci + ⌧ji)TIi + (cw + ⌧wi)Si], (17)
where i 6= j.
For the simplicity of analysis, our numerical experiments in this section assume that member
HOs are symmetric in their cost and demand parameters. Under the proportional allocation
rule and symmetric setting, the HOs that store their stocks in the UNHRD have the same
equilibrium order quantities i.e., QPP
N,n
i = Q
PPN,n
j for i, j = 1..., n, and consequently the same
expected costs. Similarly, all HOs that do not store their stocks in the UNHRD have the same
equilibrium values where QPP
N,n
i = Q
PPN,n
j for i, j = n+ 1..., N .
Our numerical experiments for the N -HOs setting confirm that the general trend of our
results holds. In particular, the optimal procurement quantities QFP
N
i , Q
PPN,n
i , i = 1...N are
increasing in the premium ⌧wi (Corollary 4.2 and 4.5) for N   2. Additionally, for model
FPN the optimal levels of premiums for backup stocks which achieve system optimality, ⌧⇤w,
are sensitive to demand correlation ⇢ (Observation 5.1) and insensitive to demand coe cient of
variation cv (Observation 5.2).
In addition, the numerical experiments in this section reveal impacts of the number of
member HOs on the UNHRD’s coordination mechanism as follows:
Observation 6.1. The optimal premium charge ⌧⇤w increases as N increases (see Figure 6).
In other words, increasing number of member HOs tends to lower their stocks whereas system
optimal stock levels increase. The result implies public good characteristics of inventories, in
which each member HO would benefit from more stocks in the system, but each wants others
to invest them. The public good characteristics of inventories are also observed in a vertical
cooperation setting (Cachon and Zipkin, 1999). We also confirm that the expected inventory
costs (i.e., CFP
N
i and C
CFPN /N) decrease as N increases.
Our numerical analysis confirms that for model PPN,n the equilibrium order quantities and
costs are sensitive to the total number of HOs N as well as to the proportion of HOs storing in
the UNHRD, n/N . Specifically, as a result that transshipment opportunities increase in n/N ,
the following is observed in our numerical analysis:
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Figure 6: Optimal order quantities QCFP
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Figure 7: Expected cost of HO i > n, CPP
N,n
i compared to HO j  n, CPP
N,n
j with respect to ⌧w,
⇢ = 0 and N = 4.
Observation 6.2. The equilibrium order quantities decrease as n/N increases.
Figure 7 shows impacts of n on the expected inventory costs of the HOs for a fixed N . As
shown in the figure, expected costs of the HOs decrease in n. Figure 7 also displays that the
free-rider benefits of HOs i = n+ 1, .., N increase in ⌧w and decrease in ⇢, which are consistent
with the results in section 5.3.
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7. Summary and Discussion
The present work makes a unique contribution to the studies of not-for-profit operations man-
agement in that it sheds light on a governance mechanism to control a lateral stock transship-
ment system in humanitarian sectors. We have presented an analytical framework to explore
horizontal cooperation between HOs for their inventory management. This type of cooperation
is observed in the UNHRD, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) and European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO). We have especially
focused on the UNHRD network because the network specializes in disaster response operations,
is growing rapidly in terms of number of member HOs and has a more holistic horizontal coop-
eration in inventory management, including stock transshipment and backup stocks. Currently,
the UNHRD does not take any measures for system optimality although they are subject to a
tight budget constraint. Our analytical and numerical results indicate that behaviors of mem-
ber HOs do not necessarily align with the UNHRD’s expectation, which is consistent with our
interview results. To identify key factors that achieve system optimality, we have proposed the
premium fee for backup stocks, which satisfies the three conditions (i.e., direct controllability,
no financial burden, and potential revenue source).
Our results suggest several managerial recommendations for the UNHRD. As long as every
member HO has stocks to loan in warehouses of the UNHRD, charging the premium would
achieve the first-best system optimality. The result implies that the UNHRD should resolve
current impediments which induce some member HOs’ partial-participating behaviors before
implementing the premium if it seeks to achieve the first-best system optimality. Otherwise,
implementing the premium would lead partially-participating HOs to enjoy a free-rider benefit.
This partially-participating HOs’ advantage would accelerate member HOs’ reduction of their
stock ratio in UNHRD’s warehouses, which may eventually compromise the functioning of stock
transshipment between member HOs. The UNHRD is currently considering transferring the au-
thority of restocking decisions from member HOs to the UNHRD for more e cient and e↵ective
network operations. This new restocking policy is somewhat similar to our centralized models.
Compared with this new restocking policy, charging the premium fee that we propose appeals
more to individual member HO’s self-enforcing motivation. The UNHRD should consider which
measure is more appropriate from the perspective of e ciency, e↵ectiveness and equity between
member HOs and the UNHRD. Our research also reveals a key indicator for levels of the pre-
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mium for system optimality. The UNHRD should select an appropriate premium level before
disasters occur based on information about demand correlations between member HOs. In this
respect, the UNHRD should also collect detailed and su cient data on demand for relief items
that individual member HOs store in warehouses of the UNHRD.
Our research also proposes several managerial recommendations for the HOs. HOs would
enjoy cost-saving benefits by participating in the UNHRD network as long as they adjust their
order quantities depending on levels of the premium. For a higher (lower) premium, mem-
ber HOs should increase (decrease) their order quantities. From an individual member HO’s
viewpoint, behaving as a partial participant is economically rationalized especially if they have
own warehouses and/or partnerships with private logistics companies (sometimes on a pro-bono
basis), which is common among large HOs. Partial participants could enjoy a lower expected
inventory cost than full participants. However, member HOs should keep in mind that the ad-
vantage of partially-participating behavior is diminishing as the trend of member HOs’ demands
becomes similar. They should carefully analyze demand patterns of disaster relief items which
other member HOs store in warehouses of the UNHRD. The real time reports on member HOs’
stocks provided by the UNHRD are a useful information source for them.
In closing the paper, we highlight four avenues for future research. The current model
ignores the impact of member HOs’ budget flexibility. Many HOs face several challenges of
earmarked funds. How budget flexibility a↵ects performance of horizontal cooperation is an
important future research area. Secondly, considering the rapidly growing number of member
HOs, how capacity of the UNHRD’s warehouses and backup stock constraints a↵ect horizontal
cooperation is an important area for further research. Thirdly, a result obtained from the
current model indicates that the UNHRD cannot set an applicable premium for backup stocks
if some member HOs do not store their stocks in UNHRD’s warehouses. The UNHRD may
not have the authority to require member HOs to store a minimum stock level in UNHRD’s
warehouses. Exploring other coordination mechanisms under member HOs’ partial involvement
in the network is also an important future research area. Lastly, in the analysis of the multi-HOs
case, comparing results between di↵erent stock allocation rules would be a promising research
extension.
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Appendix: List of interviews
Organization Country Types of Position of Date
organization interviewees
Cooperative for Assistance US NGO Senior Manager Logistics 08.07.2014
and Relief Everywhere and Operations
(CARE) Emergency
United Nations Humanitarian Italy UN Chief 22.07.2014
Response Depot UNHRD Brindisi Manager & 08.07.2016
(UNHRD) Deputy Network Coordinator
Japan International Japan Government Deputy Director General 30.07.2014
Cooperation Agency agency
(JICA)
Lutheran World Relief US NGO Emergency Program 04.11.2014
(LWR) Manager
MercyCorps US NGO Strategic Emergency 04.11.2014
Response Team
Norwegian Church Aid’s Norway NGO Head of Global Logistics 17.11.2014
(NCA)
World Vision Australia NGO Global Lead 18.12.2014
- Emergency logistics
ShelterBoX UK NGO Supply Chain Manager 18.12.2014
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